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Abstract
COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba) is an indigenous organization that
promotes the rights of thirty native Amazonian communities in the face of the Camisea Project, a
massive natural gas extraction project. The state has consistently ignored negative health,
environmental, and cultural impacts from five spills that have occurred in the natural gas
pipeline, and the communities the right of consultation granted to them in the International Labor
Organization’s Convention 169. This paper, using interviews with Machiguenga community
members and COMARU leadership in addition to political ecology scholarship, analyzes the
success of COMARU’s politicized and depoliticized strategies. Through the use of four criteria,
it determines that while the organization needs to make several changes to how it operates as a
change agent, it is generally successful due to its ability to navigate unequal power structures
within Peru and genuinely listen to the voices of the communities.

Introduction
In a school building in the Amazonian community of Shimaa, I sit at a table observing a
meeting between the community’s teacher, health promoter, community members and two
leaders of COMARU. On the wall is a sign that reads, “Respecting ourselves we will live better.”
Just outside of the school is a traditional Machiguenga hut with a roof constructed of leaves,
whereas the school in which we sat was made of concrete. This is because it was constructed as
compensation by TGP, the company that constructed a natural gas pipeline directly through
Shimaa. The pipeline is within walking distance from the school. Alfredo, the community
health promoter, stands up to give his account of the current health maladies in the community:
parasites, uterine cancer, boils, all due to water contamination from ruptures in the pipeline that
leads through the community. He insists that the state should at least provide a health post
stocked with medical supplies for the community. Alfredo currently has to zipline out of the
community to Kepashiato, where he buys medicine for the community with his own money.
COMARU listens intently and takes notes.
In the Southeast Peruvian Amazon, natural gas extraction through the Camisea Project is
having incredibly adverse health, environmental, and cultural impacts on native Machiguenga
1
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communities (Earle 2009; Vences 2006; Bruijn 2010). A traditionally silenced population,
Machiguengas have suffered these consequences despite the promises of the Peruvian state to
involve them in decision-making and to make sure they, too, benefit from the extraction.
COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba) is an organization entirely composed of
Machiguengas that works intimately with thirty Machiguenga communities to promote their
rights in the face of the project. In this paper, using a political ecology framework, I will analyze
the success of COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba) using four criteria of
success: achieving legitimate representation of the communities, fostering of a collective
Machiguenga identity which is necessary for a powerful mobilization, achieving adequate
compensation and attention through negotiations with the state and energy companies, and
holding the state accountable for laws that protect indigenous rights through politicized tactics
such as strikes and protests.
While COMARU was originally established as a representative organization, conveying
the needs of the communities to external powerholders who have the finances to implement
development projects, elevated threats from the Camisea Project have prompted COMARU to
transform itself into a social movement organization. COMARU now uses politicized tactics
such as strikes and roadblocks to jolt the state into fulfilling its promises of indigenous
consultation and compensation. First, I will provide background information on the Camisea
Project and Machiguengas. Additionally, I will a political ecological framework that informs the
case study in order to clarify the power structure COMARU navigates in order to function as a
social movement organization. After I discuss the adverse impacts reported to me through
interviews with Machiguenga community members and leaders of COMARU, I will analyze the
success of COMARU using my four criteria of success previously mentioned. Finally, in my
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conclusion, I will make recommendations for the organization. This research is important
because it sheds light on voices of Amazonian communities that are traditionally marginalized.
Additionally, it provides a case study of an organization that, for the most part, successfully
navigates unequal power dynamics between the communities, state, energy companies and
international NGO’s to achieve substantial change in the communities and capture the world’s
attention.

Methodology
This research was carried out partly through ethnographic interviews with leaders of
COMARU at their office in Quillabamba, Peru, where I interviewed them about the philosophy
of the organization and their perceptions of the Camisea Project. I also traveled with several
COMARU leaders to five communities impacted by the Camisea Project in Alto Urubamba:
Korimani, Chakopishiato, Inkaare, Monte Carmelo and Shimaa. There, I gathered ethnographic
interviews from community leaders, and a few community members.
In each community, I observed meetings between leaders of COMARU and community
members where they discussed impacts of the Camisea Project in addition to other intercommunity conflicts. I also include observations from an anniversary party of COMARU, where
I observed Machiguengas celebrate their culture through singing and dancing. Apart from field
work, I relied on research from political ecology scholars to understand how COMARU
functions within a power web in order to fight for change.
It is important to note that my position as a white American woman brings with it
inherent biases in how I envision indigenous organization and development. However, I hope
that my unique opportunity to travel with COMARU will provide a unique perspective of the
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inner-workings of the organization and contribute to pre-existing critiques of their
efficaciousness.

Theoretical Framework
Political ecology is an essential tool for studying social movements given that it helps one
to understand how power structures both facilitate environmental degradation and provide
momentum for local mobilization. It also informs how one understands the various scales of
power within which COMARU operates to enact change. In my discussion of political ecology
and its applications to the social movement COMARU is constructing, I will adhere most closely
to Peet and Watts’ definition of political ecology. They define it as a “confluence between
ecologically rooted social science and the principles of political economy” and envision
“possibilities for broadening environmental issues into a movement for livelihood entitlements,
and social justice” (Peet and Watts, 1996b, pp. 38-9).
In my discussion of the impacts of the Camisea Project and COMARU’s subsequent
organizing of Machiguenga communities, I will refer to the environmental identity and social
thesis, which says that environmental conditions create opportunities for local groups to define
and represent themselves politically (Robbins 2004). Robbins distinguishes this branch of
political ecology as being heavily focused on sociology, focusing on cultural networks and
political system upheavals.
Social movement theory is also critical to understanding the politicization of COMARU’s
strategies. Bebbington refers to social movements as “vehicles through which the concerns of
poor and marginalized groups are given greater visibility within civil society” (Bebbington et al.,
2008,p. 2888) They rest upon the formation of a collective identity, and often unite individuals
who encompass a variety of diversities apart from class, such as gender, ethnicity and race
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(Moore 1998; Dirlik and Prazniak 2001). Using social network theory, I will explain how
COMARU can contemporarily be understood as a social movement organization rather than
simply a representative entity, utilizing an aggressive campaign to fight for Machiguenga rights.
Finally, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed provides an important framework for
which to understand power dynamics between Machiguenga communities oppressed by the
impacts of the Camisea Project and the state and extractive companies. Freire defines the
oppressed as those who are “prevented from being fully human” (Freire, 1982,p. 42) and their
oppressors as those who abuse their power towards violence, possessiveness and depreciation of
the oppressed. It is important that the oppressed abandon their belief in the invulnerability of the
oppressor because they are the only ones who can liberate themselves and their oppressor. Freire
stresses that is essential that the oppressed be the main actors in their liberation process.
Otherwise they will be involved in ‘pseudo-participation’, not ‘committed involvement’” (p. 56).
Genuine participation of the oppressed in their liberation can only come from equal collaboration
with any entity that may assist them with their liberation in addition to “a permanent relationship
of dialogue with the oppressed” (p. 55).
COMARU plays a key role in facilitating the liberation of Machiguenga communities
from their oppression, and through this role they act as a “change agent” (Burkey 1993). Change
agents serve as a link between local communities and powerholders and “give legitimacy to
groups before they have acquired strength and acceptance on their own” (Burkey, 1993, p.173).
This paper will analyze how well COMARU carries out that role of “change agent”.

Background on the Camisea Project
Natural gas was first discovered in the South Eastern Peruvian Amazon in 1978, but it
wasn’t extracted until August of 2004 with the initiation of the Camisea Project (Earle and Pratt
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2009). In this year, two pipelines were constructed starting from Camisea’s gas fields in the
Amazon stretching all the way across the Andes to Lima on the coast. Peru’s Camisea natural
gas project is a $1.6 billion project, $75 million of it funded through a direct loan from the IDB
(Hearn 2007). The project has been marketed as a key development strategy through its potential
to transform Peru into a net energy exporter, attracting many multinational extractive companies.
However, the state and energy companies show a lack of concern over the projects adverse
impacts on the health and livelihoods of the Machiguenga native communities who live in and
around the sites where gas extraction and transportation take place.
Five ruptures have occurred in the pipeline transporting natural gas liquids from Camisea
to Lima (Hearn 2007).
Figure 1
Spills along TGP natural gas duct that passes from Camisea in Bajo Urubamba
to Lima.

.
(Vences 2006)
Techint and TGP, two companies involved in pipeline construction, deny the faulty construction
of the pipe, although a report filed by E-tech found that 40% of the pipes were leftovers from
other transportation projects, they were heavily corroded, and the welders lacked certification
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(Hearn 2007). These spills have directly contaminated Machiguenga water supplies, leading to
extremely adverse health, environmental and cultural impacts within the communities.

Background on Machiguengas
The ethnicity of the members of the communities that are being impacted extraction and
transportation processes of the Camisea Project is Machiguenga. Machiguengas are traditionally
primarily characterized as shy people, their goal to “minimize contact with the larger world
rather than to confront and try to control it” (Johnson, 2003, p. 11). For this reason,
Machiguengas have settled in relatively isolated areas, even though the fish and game animals
tend to be scarce where they have settled. Machiguengas fish for trout and hunt monkeys, tapir,
parrots, deer, spectacled bear, anteaters, depending on the elevation (Johnson 2003). Since the
ruptures in TGP’s pipeline and the resulting water contamination, it has been increasingly
difficult to find fish and animals and at times have to rely on canned sardines and rice to
supplement their diet.
Despite the popular notion the individualism is a strictly Western concept, Machiguengas
are extremely individualistic and resent outside intrusions. This individualism is one of the main
reasons they exist in low population densities and their settlements are very dispersed (Johnson
2003). It also rationalizes the resentment Machiguengas feel towards the presence of energy
company and TGP workers in their communities.
Despite the resentment worker presences ignite, several Machiguenga characteristics
provide barriers to collective action. First, Machiguenga community ties normally extend no
further than the family unit. Both their highly dispersed settlements and individualistic attitudes
prevent them from coming together regularly for anything other than fishing (Johnson 2003).
Rosengren argues that “it is only in times of perceived external threat that individuals come
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together to co-operate” (as cited in Earle and Pratt, 2009, p. 12). Second, voicing concerns is not
something Machiguengas feel comfortable doing; their voices are typically extremely soft.
Manners are highly valued and they usually repress their anger through grudges rather than
outwardly demonstrating it (Johnson, 2003).
Machiguengas, although their culture is quickly changing, are often viewed in urban
regions in Peru as backwards, uneducated and savage. The word chunchos, which means “wild
ones” in Quechua, is sometimes used in reference to Amazonian peoples (Rénique, 2009, p.
118). In contrast to indigenous peoples in the Andes, who are simultaneously marginalized but
are considered “reputed inheritors of a romanticized imperial civilization” (p. 118), Amazonian
peoples are viewed more as uncivilized savages who choose to separate themselves from the
dominant culture in Peru. Natalie Smith comments on an expectation for Machiguengas “to
work together as an ethnic group in the aggressive protection of their territory and traditional
livelihoods,” and to, “assign a type of primordial role to indigenous peoples” (as cited in Earle,
2009, p. 705).
Another common stereotype about Machiguengas is that they are inherently linked to the
environment. On the other end of the spectrum, I have also encountered the belief that because
Machiguengas experience low levels of education, they should not have the power to manage
their own land. A civil engineer from Cusco, Peru said:
“Because they (Machiguengas) have little formal education, they don’t understand
what the environment is. They live simply as part of the environment, but they don’t
know the importance of the environment.” (civil engineer, personal interview, May 2,
2010).
This quote reflects a common sentiment that rests within Peruvian urban culture, that
Amazonians are uneducated and weak.
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Alan García, Peru’s current president, has said, “These people don’t have crowns. They
aren’t first-class citizens who can say…’You [the government] don’t have the right to be here.’
No way.” García went on to call indigenous protesters “pseudo-indigenous” and accused
indigenous leaders of a protest in Bagua of terrorism (Rénique, 2009, p. 121).

The Camisea Project: Impacts on Machiguenga Health, Environment and
Culture
Local Perceptions in Monte Carmelo, Korimani, Shimaa, Chakopishiato, and Inkaare
In order to comprehend COMARU’s motivations for organizing Alto and Bajo
Urubamba, it is important to understand the incredibly adverse impacts these communities
experience due to the Camisea Project. The quotes cited below come from five communities in
Alto Urubamba, which the natural gas pipeline crosses through. However, these interviews
represent only a small sampling of the health, environmental and cultural impacts the project has
on native Amazonian communities.
I interviewed community members about perceptions of the Camisea Project’s impacts in
five Alto Urubamba communities: Monte Carmelo, Korimani, Chakopishiato, Shimaa, and
Inkaare. Alto Urubamba lies in the Province of La Convención, which is in the region of Cusco.
Community members in all five communities are Machiguenga and most speak Machiguenga as
their first language and Spanish as their second. Families live very dispersed within the
community. Health resources in each community were lacking: none of them had a health post
and only Shimaa had a health care provider, who was deemed a promotor de salud.
While reactions towards the project varied slightly in each community, perceptions of the
Camisea Project were overwhelmingly negative. Interviews with informants reflected a deep
concern towards the project’s impacts on human health, fish and wildlife populations, and the
survival of Machiguenga cultural tradition. Most of these impacts are directly or indirectly
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related to water contamination caused by various ruptures in the gas duct that transports gas from
Camisea to Lima (Johnson 2005). In addition to recognizing the negative impacts of the project,
community members verbalized the urgent need for assistance from COMARU to help solve
these problems.

Figure 2:
The first TGP gas duct in relation to the five communities studied in Alto
Urubamba

(COMARU)
Impacts that appear to be the most profound for the communities are the death of fish and
animals that they depend on for food due to natural gas contamination in their major water
sources. This has led to a profound state of malnutrition. Another commonly voiced impact was
the increased presence of illnesses such as nausea, vomiting and fever, which is probably also
due to contamination of drinking water.
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Machiguengas in these communities conceptualize environmental and health impacts of

the project in terms of how they effect their wellbeing and livelihoods, but also through a cultural
lens. This quote is from Jorge Kategari, assistant to the chief of Monte Carmelo, in response to a
question regarding his memories of the community when he was younger, before the initiation of
the Camisea Project in 2004.
“There wasn’t immigration of the colonists to this zone. The majority were
Machiguengas. So, because there were small numbers of colonists in this zone and
also few Machiguenga inhabitants, there was an abundance of fish, an abundance of wild
animals that we ate as food. Also, there was a lot of timber, medicinal plants, and
also in relation to our culture, we had it almost intact. We practiced our cultural
identity. We still had to use our own dress which is the cusma, we used arrows, we used
instruments to hunt the animals in the forests…almost everything was natural.1 (Jorge
Kategari, personal interview” April 16, 2010).
Andrés Mamanki, the ex-Chief of Korimani, expressed a similar sentiment towards
“colonos”, presumably TGP workers, who enter the communities. He said, “Now we are
becoming civilized. Many colonists come, the civilizations. We’re losing our culture” (Andrés
Mamanki, personal interview, April 16, 2010). This concern regarding cultural change as a
result of the presence of TGP workers was an urgent concern for community members. Their use
of the term colonos, or colonists, when referring to them highlights their sentiments of feeling
colonized. This metaphor was present throughout interviews with COMARU as well. The
president of COMARU, Rubén Miguel Binari Piñarreal, said, “With the presence of the
companies there is a massive influx of people from the exterior making the communities lose
their culture,” and “Before, we lived in Alto and Bajo Urubamba in a paradise when there were
no roads. It was pure, Everything was beautiful. There were animals, There were monkeys. Now
there aren’t. Now, colonization comes.” (Rubén Miguel Binari Piñarreal, personal interview,
April 16, 2010).
1

Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Spanish to English were carried out by the author.
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Adverse health effects from water contamination were another repeatedly mentioned
concern. According to Mamanki, Korimani is suffering from, “yellow fever, tuberculosis,
diarrhea and parasites.” Once again, perceptions of COMARU leaders mirrored that of
community members. Plinio said, “Now you don’t see clean water, just muddy water. This at the
same time kills fish and also, for example, another product of this is that the community
members have to drink this. This also generates diseases: parasites or other illnesses with the
digestive system” (Plinio Kategari Kashiari, personal interview, April 27, 2010). Additionally,
Rubén spoke of rapid transmission of STDs from workers to community members due to the
lack of preparedness of their immune systems. Rúben spoke of at least three communities in
Bajo Urubamba in which cases of HIV/AIDS have been reported, and he says Peru’s Ministry of
Health has not initiated any educational programs to prevent further transmission. Rúben also
mentioned the rise in alcoholism in the communities because workers make it more accessible
(Rubén Miguel Binari Piñarreal, personal interview, April 16, 2010).
The only health care provider in any of the communities was Alfredo Capa in Shimaa.
He provided me with information regarding new emerging illnesses in the community since the
construction of TGP’s natural gas duct, which he says runs about a kilometer from Shimaa’s
school. Shimaa lies between two rivers, the Río Shimaa and the Río Kompiroshiatov (Johnson,
2003, p. 23), and these drinking water sources have been contaminated by natural gas from a
rupture in the pipeline. In order to obtain medicine for the community, Capa ziplines across a
river to Kepashiato, the closest community with a health post, where he buys medication for the
community with his own money. Alfredo says that there are now more cases of leg infections
and intestinal infections now that the gasduct passes through the community. Another

12

13
devastating new illness that has begun to afflict pregnant women in the community, according to
Alfredo, is uterine cancer. (Alfredo Capa, personal interview, April 18, 2010)
Mamanki expressed the fact that these impacts establish a great need for COMARU to
represent the communities. He said, “If we are not going to do these things, (collaborate with
COMARU), who is going to help us? Who is going to defend us? There is no one who can save
us.” (Andrés Mamanki, personal interview, April 16, 2010). In the following sections, I will
discuss the strategies COMARU uses to attract national and international attention to these grave
injustices native Amazonian communities are experiencing due to the Camisea Project.
Additionally, I will evaluate the success of COMARU’s strategies to achieve compensation from
extractive companies and to promote state political accountability.

Organizational Structure of COMARU
COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Rio Urubamba) has evolved to become the most
active and influential organization in the Camisea region despite its small leadership base and
limited financial resources (Earle and Pratt 2009). As a non-profit founded in 1991, its primary
stated objective is to protect the wellbeing of the 30 native communities with whom they affiliate
and represent. Eighteen of these communities are situated in Alto Urubamba and twelve in Bajo
Urubamba (Earle and Pratt 2009). While other organizations such as AIDESEP (National
Organization of the Amazon Indigenous People of Peru) and CEDIA (Center for Indigenous
Amazonian Development) also work for Amazonian indigenous rights in the face of the Camisea
Project, COMARU undoubtedly works the most intimately with indigenous communities
impacted by extraction in the Camisea gas fields. Nevertheless, COMARU gains some of its
political legitimacy through collaborating with those groups, because as Burkey notes, small,
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isolated groups have limited power when they do not team up with like-minded groups (Burkey
1993).
While COMARU has an extensive agenda, including improving community education
and full registration of all Machiguenga territories, its most all-encompassing and urgent goal is
one that was outlined in a 2004 meeting between COMARU representatives and delegates from
all of COMARU’s affiliated communities: “Ensure the full realization of indigenous rights to
ancestral lands, as well as to autonomy, indigenous self-determination and jurisdiction, economic
development with identity, and culturally appropriate education and health, as set out in national
Law and Convention 169 of the ILO” (Earle and Pratt, 2009, p.10).
Due to the mistrust members of COMARU’s affiliated communities hold towards larger
international NGO’s and white individuals who are deemed ‘colonos’, COMARU is made up
solely of Machiguengas. They believe this is the only way in which they the organization can
truly understand and represent the voices of their affiliate communities. Because COMARU
leaders were born in the same communities they represent, they have extremely intimate ties to
them.
Earle and Pratt (2009) describe how, although COMARU was founded originally for the
purpose of representing its affiliated indigenous communities, “it has begun to adopt protest
strategies and mobilize collective activities that are drawn from the strategic repertoire of social
movements, specifically protest marches, blockades and boycotts (p. 24). While COMARU has
indeed made this transition, it maintains its representative role. In this role, it serves as an
intermediary, channeling demands of the communities to the Peruvian state and the companies.
Within this intermediary role, COMARU uses its authority to translate the needs and concerns of
the communities they represent, in addition to the needs of any other native community within its
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geographical range that requests assistance, into language that larger structural entities will pay
heed to.
However, as companies have consistently gone against their own codes of conduct in
dealing with communities and ruptures in the gas pipeline have led to significant impacts in
indigenous livelihoods (Earle and Pratt 2009) “COMARU has had to bring the demands and
problems of the Machiguenga, who have been all but excluded from the polity since the creation
of the Peruvian state, into the public consciousness and the political arena” (p.25). Through
protests, establishment of blockades, and direct confrontations with Peru’s armed forces,
COMARU has politicized its activities and image and evolved into a considerably more
aggressive defender of Machiguenga rights.
So far, this paper has laid out the adverse impacts Machiguenga communities in the
Southeast Peruvian Amazon experience due to the Camisea Project and emphasizes their need
for support in achieving their rights. In the following sections, I will analyze how well the
infrastructure and strategies of COMARU set the organization up for success as a change agent
for the Machiguengas.

Evaluation of COMARU’s Success as a Change Agent
In order to evaluate the success of COMARU’s efforts to act as a successful change agent
on behalf of the thirty communities that they represent in the Urubamba I will use four primary
criteria referred to earlier:
1. How well does COMARU genuinely amplify the true needs and wishes of their
thirty affiliated communities?
2. Does COMARU help to establish a collective Machiguenga identity, which is
essential for collective action to occur?
3. Does COMARU demonstrate negotiating power through their ability to procure
compensation for the communities from the state, municipality, and extractive
companies?
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3. Does COMARU hold the state accountable for complying with indigenous
rights laws, the ILO’s Convention 169 in particular through the use of
politicized tactics (strikes, protests, roadblocks, etc.)?

I. Genuine Representation of the Communities
COMARU prides itself upon its intimate collaboration with the communities it serves in
order to facilitate a development that reflects their needs. In an interview with Anibal Kategari,
the environmental technician from ProNaturaleza through the program PMAC (Programa de
Monitoreo Ambiental Comunitario), he said “COMARU is born of the communities. Whatever
decision, they make in the communities…the communities are the base that decides every
decision” (Anibal Kategari, personal interview, April 13, 2010). Similarly, Plinio, Kategari
Kashiari, Co-leader of COMARU, stated, “Meetings between chiefs of the communities, this is
what dominates the assembly in general. They are the ones who make decisions, not
COMARU…they decide what it is that COMARU is going to do. This is the most important
decision of COMARU” (Plinio Kategari Kashiari, personal interview, April 27, 2010). In this
section I will analyze to what degree COMARU accurately amplifies the needs of its affiliated
communities.
One of the primary ways in which COMARU takes stock of the needs of the
communities is by regularly traveling to each one to hold meetings with community leaders and
members. Usually about five hours long, the meetings are conducted in Machiguenga so that all
members, including ones who do not speak Spanish very well, may participate. Understandably,
COMARU’s limited financial resources from its primary source of funding, Oxfam America,
(Earle and Pratt 2009) and the substantial distance between COMARU’s office in Quillabamba
and the communities prevent COMARU from making community visits more than two or three
times per year. However infrequent, these meetings are essential tools in developing
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COMARU’s understanding of the health, environmental and concerns of the communities in
addition to communication the communities’ rights to them. In other words, an invaluable
dialogue and trust is forged between COMARU and the communities at these meetings. After
listening to community concerns at meetings, COMARU uses meeting information about
community needs to persuade the municipality Echarate, extractive companies and the state to
implement projects such as the construction of schools.
During community meetings, leaders from COMARU sit at the front of the room in front
of the Jefe of the community and other community members. These are two separate agendas
Plinio, the co-leader of COMARU wrote on the board in Inkaare and Chakopishiato:
Meeting Agenda2
1.Alto Lagunas Road4
-passage of vehicles
-falsification of signatures
2. Communication Radio
3. Educational Institution
4. No participation of young people
in community’s activities
5. Community organization

Community Development Plan3
1. Education
2. Health
3. Land and Resources
4. Culture
5. Community organization

COMARU addresses problems specific to each community such as the construction of the Alto
Lagunas road in Inkaare and the passage of the TGP natural gas duct through Shimaa. In
Korimani, during my trip with COMARU, a heated argument over territory rights broke out
between community members, and COMARU used a map to determine who should hold
territory rights. While COMARU deals with these specific problems in each community, they
commonly addressed these themes in every community: education, maintenance of culture in the
face of the Camisea Project, health issues afflicting the communities due to water contamination
2

Meeting agenda from Inkaare
Community development plan from community meeting in Chakopishiato
4
Alto Lagunas is a newly constructed road in Inkaare
3

17

18
from the pipeline ruptures, and strengthening community organization. COMARU greatly
stressed community cooperation and said to Inkaare: “the most important thing is to not be
divided.”
Community member participation in the meetings varied greatly. In Korimani,
community members were extremely timid, therefore COMARU and the ex-leader of the
community, Andrés Mamanki did the majority of the talking. In Chakopishiato and Inkaare,
where Plinio asked community members to voice their desires for the communities, they
willingly did so. Inkaare community members wanted a person to give doses of medicine, a radio
to be able to report accidents, to be able to call ambulances in Kiteni, medicine because they are
seven hours from a health post, and better transportation. Shimaa residents participated by far the
most out of the five communities I visited. The health promoter, teacher and chief of the
community all individually stood up and spoke of wishes they had for the community. Despite
variations in levels of community participation, extremely high turnouts at each meeting
demonstrated each community’s trust in COMARU and investment in the promotion of their
rights.
It is clear that community members view meetings with COMARU as an essential
strategy of communicating their concerns surrounding the Camisea Project and other community
problems. While they occur infrequently due to funding limitation, they make COMARU unique
in that they insure that community members have a voice in what local development projects are
pursued. This strategy allows COMARU to relate more intimately with the communities than
INGO’s, whom have in the past used poor communication methods. According to Pratt (2007),
when international and local NGOs have attempted to engage with Machiguenga, they have used
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large workshops, which didn’t resonate with locals. Overall, they seemed to be more driven by
their own agendas rather than by the true needs of the Machiguengas.

II. Development of a Collective Identity
One of the primary goals of COMARU is to protect and strengthen Machiguenga identity
in the face of unwanted development (COMARU 2009). COMARU recognizes that, despite the
heterogeneity of the communities it represents, the creation of a collective identity is the only
way Machiguengas can successfully battle Camisea. Whittier (2002) recognizes this necessity as
such:
Even movements that organize around collectivities that are recognized and legitimized
by the dominant culture…must nevertheless construct collective experience: who the
group are, what their attributes are, what they have in common, how they are different
from other groups, and what the political significance of all this is (as cited in Earle,
2009, p. 710)

Social networks such as COMARU are important in shaping such a collective identity because
they facilitate the solidification of identities “with a specific political contention (Passy 2003;
cited in Earle 2009). COMARU, through it’s media discourse, has promoted the popular notion
that Machiguengas are intrinsically connected to nature, and by doing so, have shaped their
collective identity through the lens of this historically popular stereotype. In this section, I will
analyze to what extent COMARU perpetuates the stereotype of the “noble savage” for the sake
of forming a collective identity and also to what extent COMARU permits the Machiguengas
they represent to participate in the process of their own liberation.
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Earlier, I discussed Freire’s theory of the pedagogy of the oppressed (1970), which says
that oppressed groups must adopt an active role in the process of their own liberation. He says,
“While no one liberates himself by his own efforts alone, neither is he liberated by others”
(p.53). Using this ideological framework, the Machiguenga communities can be thought of as the
oppressed who are marginalized by their oppressors, the Peruvian government and extractive
companies. Burkey (1993) promotes the concept of participatory development as a way of
ensuring that local groups have a voice in their own development, which mirrors Freir’s
argument. While the change agent, in this case COMARU, may serve as an intermediary
between locals and larger power-holders, an effective development approach must be rooted in
grassroots efforts (Burkey, 1993, p. 166).
COMARU recognizes that it is important for the communities they represent to take an
active role in their liberation and that this is achieved by improving Machiguenga confidence.
Only when they overcome a lack of confidence in themselves can they rid themselves of their
“diffuse, magical belief in the invulnerability and the power of the oppressor” (Freire, 1982, p.
50) and begin to participate in their struggle for liberation. In an interview with Plinio, he
commented on how happy he felt when a community member said, “Here I am! Here I am!”
upon seeing himself in a picture of a strike on a COMARU t-shirt. Therefore, the strikes and
protests which COMARU have increasingly relied upon effectively contribute to a collective
Machiguenga identity, despite their dispersed geographic origins. The anniversary party
COMARU threw in Quillabamba soon after our trip to Alto Urubamba also served as a means of
fostering collective identity and Machiguenga pride. There, community members from both Bajo
and Alto Urubamba participated in celebrations of Machiguenga culture through dance and
singing performances.
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In its efforts to establish a collective identity, however, COMARU sometimes serves to
erroneously homogenize the Machiguenga identity and to perpetuate popular stereotypes of
natives inherently living in harmony with their environment. Plinio, in an interview, said that,
“By nature the Machiguenga has always characterized himself to be a conservationist, to live
with nature”, and “They say that the native, the Machiguenga, without resources or without the
environment, isn’t a native, isn’t a person” (Plinio, personal interview, April 27, 2010). In
COMARU’s 2009 bulletin that lists the goals and projects of the organization, COMARU refers
to “the extractive gas companies, who have created a disequilibrium in the habitat of our
indigenous brothers” which assumes that Machiguengas naturally live in an equilibrium state
with nature (COMARU 2009).
Earle (2009) says that by stressing this harmonious relationship, COMARU is most likely
attempting to appeal to Western notions of Amazonian indigenous identity, which generally
assumes a harmonious bond between indigenous peoples and nature. However, shared
geographical origins does not mean that all Machiguuenga have the same needs and attitudes.
The perpetuation of this stereotype leads to the creation of an “imagined community” (cited in
Earle, 2009, p. 707).
Another potential result of COMARU’s identity work is their establishment of an ‘Us
versus them’ mentality (Bruijn, 2010, p. 487) in which the Machiguenga begin to envision
themselves as caretakers of the environment and the Peruvian state and extractive companies as
evil representatives of modernization (p. 487). While this dichotomy is oversimplified, and
COMARU recognizes this oversimplification, they support this dichotomy in order to foster a
collective identity based upon anger towards their oppressors. This anger prompts the
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communities to band together and pursue collective action through strikes and protests which
will be discussed more in-depth later.
III. Effectiveness of Depoliticized Tactics
In the following two sections, I will analyze the effectiveness of COMARU’s
organizational strategies, both politicized and depoliticized. As previously mentioned,
COMARU has made a tangible shift from acting primarily as a representative organization
towards a social movement organization. However, as noted by Earle, COMARU “is still at root
a representative organization…it was not founded to protest against the work of energy
companies (Earle 2009). COMARU’s members function as intermediaries between the
communities, state, municipality, and extractive companies, translating cultural and linguistic
differences to achieve favorable outcomes for the communities. Through this role, leaders of
COMARU serve as change agents, “giving legitimacy to groups before they have acquired
strength and acceptance on their own” (Burkey 1993).
One of the defining characteristics of a change agent, according to Burkey, is their
“working directly with small groups (to) provide a vital link between the groups and local
officials” (Burkey, 1982, p. 173) COMARU demonstrated their negotiating power and ability to
provide that link when denouncing the architect of a school that was to be built in the community
of Chakopishiato by the district municipality, Echarate. The architect appeared, unannounced at
the community meeting between COMARU and the communities, and a leader of COMARU
denounced the blueprints he was carrying in front of the entire community. He said that the
school was so small that “not fit for a chorale of rabbits”, let alone children. The community
watched in awe as they saw COMARU standing up for them and their childrens’ educations in
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front of their own eyes. This incident represents COMARU’s power to negotiate on behalf of the
communities with powerholders.
COMARU’s decisions regarding the 2004 public hearing to discuss the development of
Block 56, a new energy concession, provides a second example of COMARU playing out its role
as an intermediary in negotiations. Through this example, we begin to witness COMARU’s
adoption of tactics typical of a social movement organization. Finally, it reveals criticisms from
NGOs towards COMARU’s willingness to compromise with extractive companies. The hearing
was to be held in January of 2005, but after the pipeline leading from Block 88, the first energy
concession, ruptured, COMARU decided not to attend the hearing. This decision was an
important strategic move because the development of the concession depended on the approval
of an Environmental Impact Assessment, which would take place at the public hearing. They
would not allow the hearing to take place, they decided, until their eight demands, or “ocho
puntos” had been met. Amongst the top priorities were:
1. Clarification of the cause of the spill.
2. An inspection of the whole route of the gas pipeline
3. An environmental audit of Block 88’s activities and the pipeline
4. Repair of damage to affected communities (Earle 2009)
Company and state representatives did not respond to the eight demands, so COMARU came to
the public hearing banging oil drums and shouting “Pagoreni won’t be sold, the Machiguenga
will defend it” (Earle and Pratt, 2009, p. 704). However, when leaders of CECONAMA and
COMARU were invited to hold a meeting with the extractive companies at their headquarters,
they agreed to hold a public hearing on May 10th. Some communities were too upset to attend the
hearing. COMARU, however, stood by its decision, believing that a failure to cooperate with the
companies could lead to a forfeiting of compensation and resources from the companies (Earle
2009).
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Activist NGOs who believe indigenous groups should not give extractive companies any
access to their territories labeled COMARU’s agreement to hold the public hearing as a failure of
their negotiations and protest efforts. However, COMARU recognizes that extraction is going to
continue in Peru and that it is necessary to hedge your bets when negotiating with extractive
companies. Burkey (1993) speaks of the need for change agents to encourage positive
relationships between the local groups with whom they work and local officials because
extended conflict will eventually destroy a participatory movement (p. 170). Cohen admits that
this “implies acceptance of certain rules of social interaction viewed as legitimate, at least
temporarily” (as cited in Burkey, 1993, p. 170). With these ideas in mind, COMARU recognizes
that while they don’t agree with many actions of the energy companies it is necessary to maintain
relatively positive relations with them in order to maintain compensation.
When COMARU, the Peru office of UK WWF and two other Peruvian indigenous
organizations, CECONAMA and FECONAYY negotiated with the company Shell, they were
again highly criticized. Through these negotiations, however, Shell agreed to self-contain Shell
workers’ camps to minimize worker-community interactions and to not extract in Manu National
Park, among other things (Earle 2009). COMARU, CECONAMA and FECONAYY leaders said
they were willing to negotiate with Shell because they were more reasonable than other energy
companies would have likely been.
Clearly, COMARU’s relationship with energy companies is both positive and negative as
they strive to hold them accountable but also to sustain company compensation and positive
negotiations. Johnson calls this dual relationship a testament of COMARU’s being a “central
source of legitimate representation” (Johnson 2005) because COMARU continues to “position
themselves as a thorn in the companies’ side”. According to the ex-president of COMARU,
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“We’re not bothering them so they leave, but so they improve” (Johnson 2005). This
contradictory relationship with the companies permeates many of COMARU’s activities: in the
communities, they hold meetings to organize against the energy companies in buildings
constructed by TGP, travel from community to community in a truck with a TGP logo on the
side, and watched Avatar with Monte Carmelo community members on a projector purchased by
TGP. Therefore, COMARU cunningly exploits company resources to organize against them.
While COMARU has effectively exploited its relationship with energy companies, the
organization feels negotiations with the state and the current president, Alan García, are
somewhat futile. According to the president, Rúben Miguel Binari Piñarreal, “With this Alan
Garcia we aren’t going to have clear dialogue. We’re waiting for the government to change.” He
says indigenous communities should pressure the U.S. to tell Alan Garciá “You’re not handling
the oil companies, and it’s tremendous abuse” (Rubén, personal interview, April 16, 2010).
Through the Ley de Promoción de la Inversion en La Amazonia (Ley 27037), the Peruvian
government promises to promote development in the Amazon through implementing projects to
improve, health, education, and nutrition. Rubén says that none of these promises have come to
fruition in the communities. According to him, “In Peru, democracy is not like they say it is. The
center is Lima…the state doesn’t invest like it says it does for the communities, but it invests in
bridges, in projects, in other things. But here in the communities we don’t see that reality, there
isn’t development.”
Despite the state’s negligence towards development in Amazonian native communities,
they are the ones who should be developing such health and education projects. In regards to this
sentiment, Plinio commented, “The one who should develop solutions is the central Peruvian
government. Although they have considered us third class citizens, we are born of Peruvian
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territory and we have every right to be attended by the state in education, health and sustainable
development in every one of the communities” (Plinio, personal interview, April 27 2010).
COMARU’s vehemently believes that the state will continue to neglect its promise of promoting
sustainable development in the Amazon if drastic changes aren’t made. Therefore, they have
transitioned away from being solely a representative organization towards a social movement
organization, using more aggressive tactics in hopes of finally getting state and international
attention. In the next section, I will discuss whether or not COMARU is successful in gaining
attention and influencing policy through these highly politicized actions.
IV. Effectiveness of COMARU’s Politicized Tactics – Do They Lead to Political Change?
Political ecology is an especially useful lens when thinking about COMARU as a social
movement organization because it explains how COMARU, a “meso-level” organization
“mibro-mobilizes” communities in order to combat top-down environmental change imposed on
communities by the state and extractive companies (McAdam et al. 1988; Tilly 2004).
COMARU is a meso-level organization because its actions take place at some level intermediate
between the macro and micro” (as cited in Staggenborg 2002). COMARU, whose activism is
based upon “informal friendship networks”, as McAdams says many collective action is, has
begun to utilize tactics characteristic of social movement organizations (SMOs), such as
protesting striking and blocking companies’ access to roads. Two important characteristics of
professional social movements, according to McCarthy and Zald, are attempting to impart the
image of ‘speaking for a potential constituency’ and influencing policy toward that same
constituency’, two objectives COMARU prioritizes (McAdams et al. 1988).
The environmental degradation wrought by the Camisea Project has prompted the
development of collective action from Machiguenga communities in the Southeast Peruvian
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Amazon, facilitated by COMARU as the change agent. This phenomenon reflects the
“environmental identity and social movement thesis”, which says that “changes in environmental
management regimes and environmental conditions have created opportunities or imperatives for
local groups to secure and represent themselves politically” (Robbins 2004). Machiguengas’
frustration and the opportunity to mobilize with the support of COMARU was the “critical
event” (Staggenborg 2002) that prompted them to abandon their traditional individualistic values
to fight for political change.
Another significant change signaled by this organizational shift is the communities’
ability to participate in the process of their own liberation. When COMARU functioned strictly
as a representative organization, the communities were virtually excluded from the negotiation
process. This exclusion, according to Freire, prevents them from achieving true liberation and, in
fact, deepens their oppressed state. In his words, “Those who work for liberation must not take
advantage of the emotional dependence of the oppressed…using their dependence to create still
greater dependence is an oppressor tactic” (Freire, 1982, p. 53). Now that COMARU organizes
strikes and protests which itilize, and in fact, require, the participation of the Machiguenga
communities, they may now participate in the process of their own liberation.
The central law for which COMARU is attempting to hold the state accountable is Article
15 of the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169. By becoming a signatory to
Convention 169, the Peruvian state has an obligation to give native communities the right to
“consultation, participation, and decision” in any development projects that could potentially
affect their well-being. They also must ensure affected people will experience benefits of the
extraction and be paid compensation for damages from the extraction process. (Smith 2005).
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COMARU feels that these “rights that the Peruvian government has accepted as law are not
being applied in Peru” (Plinio, personal interview, April 27, 2010).
Earle cites three instances in 2005 in which COMARU has successfully mobilized
Machiguenga communities to shed light on inadequate responses towards ruptures in the natural
gas pipeline (Earle, 2009, p. 26) The first protest activity occurred in response to the previously
mentioned public hearing to approve the Environmental Impact Assessment for Block 56. They
shouted slogans, waved banners, and banged on empty oil cylinders in order to draw attention to
authorities’ apathetic attitude towards the spill. After that hearing was suspended and
rescheduled, the hearing had to be suspended again when COMARU arranged a boycott (Earle
2009). While COMARU eventually agreed to hold the hearing in fear of losing compensation
from the company, it helped COMARU get its feet wet in terms of protesting. The second protest
occurred after the fourth rupture in the pipeline when COMARU, in conjunction with two other
indigenous organizations, blockaded a river to prevent the transportation of supplies to Camisea.
These protests are significant not only because they attract attention from extractive
companies, but also because they promote Machiguenga confidence and a collective identity.
Plinio, the Sub-Jefe of COMARU says, “What’s lacking is the self-esteem in every one of the
communities. Commenting on a 2009 protest, he said:
“One very important aspect is that never in Peru has anyone held a strike for 150 days.
But the indigenous have, they’ve done it. It’s a big lesson that the citizens of Peru have
received. To show our gratitude to our comrades who have fought, we made t-shirts. It
makes me really happy when they say ‘Here I am, here I am, look at the picture!’ With
that, they feel valued and that they haven’t fought for nothing, but for a noble cause.”
(Plinio, personal interview, April 27, 2010).
Clearly, politicized actions help COMARU to achieve one of their goals of fostering a
collective identity and increasing the communities’ confidence in their ability to organize.
Unfortunately, however, COMARU’s politicized actions have compromised their already small
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financial pool by sacrificing financial support from INGOs that want to “maintain their
neutrality” (Earle and Pratt 2009). INGOs completely against negotiating with extractive
companies criticize COMARU for collaborating with companies while NGOs that require state
approval of their development work criticize COMARU for their aggressive protests that anger
the state. According to Pratt, NGO support for COMARU has been minimal, partly because of
their wanting to maintain their neutrality. While many claim to support the ideals of the
organization, only one INGO has financially supported its efforts for a significant period of time
(Pratt 2007).
COMARU has amplified its reputation as a social movement organization on an
international scale through its active participation in protests against the “Law of the Jungle”.
This package of degrees created by the president, Alan García, open up additional tracts of the
Amazon to foreign investment, and legal experts say that at least nine of the decrees violate
Convention 169 (Rénique 2009). Violent protests involving COMARU and other indigenous
organizations such as AIDESEP and the Peruvian Jungle Inter-Ethnic Development Association
against these decrees developed into a popular indigenous uprising between April and June of
2009. Images of Machiguengas in traditional dress, carrying signs and bows and arrows appeared
in popular media, in addition to reports of the violent clashes between indigenous groups and
police.
In early June 2009, police fired upon a crowd of indigenous protesters blocking a
highway led to the oil pipeline in Bagua, in the northern region of the Peruvian Amazon. The
New York Times reported the death tolls at twenty-five indigenous people, twenty-two civilians,
and eleven police offers. García responded to the events by saying, “We have to understand
when there are resources like oil, gas and timber, they don’t belong only to the people who had
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the fortune to be born there, because that would mean more than half of Peru’s territory belongs
to a few thousand people” (Romero 2009).
As a result of these roadblocks, demonstrations, and marches, García’s approval rate
dropped to below 25% (Rénique 2009). Finally, in June of 2009, Congress annulled decrees
1015 and 1073, the two considered to be the most offensive (Rénique 2009). This victory was a
huge success, and proof that mobilization, even when it takes place amongst a group that has
been historically oppressed can lead to political change.

Conclusions and Recommendations for COMARU
Since the initiation of the Camisea Project, the Peruvian state has treated native
communities in the Amazon as third-class citizens. They have ignored their promise to consult
communities and denied them of essential resources to promote sustainable development within
the communities. The increasingly adverse impacts of the project have prompted the
Machiguengas to overcome their traditional shyness and individualistic attitudes to mobilize with
COMARU for their rights.
Community meetings between COMARU and the communities are an essential tool for
establishing a clear dialogue between the two regarding concerns and desires for their
communities. COMARU shows a genuine interest in the communities due to their actually being
from the communities and their physically traveling to the communities to hold these meetings.
However, these imperative meetings occur infrequently due to time and funding limitations.
NGOs, on the other hand, generally use tactics such as workshops that don’t foster a relationship
of trust like the communities have with COMARU. Therefore, COMARU should allocate more
of their funding towards traveling to communities more than once a year, as they are a critical
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component of their strategy of legitimate representation and intimate connection with the
communities.
COMARU recognizes that, in order to increase the self-confidence of the communities
and to build a common foundation for the social movement they are generating, they must work
towards creating a collective Machiguenga identity. Strikes and cultural celebrations are both
important strategies to achieving that collective identity. However, in COMARU’s development
of collective identity, they frequently utilize the ‘noble savage’ stereotype, an oversimplified
representation of native Amazonian peoples, in order to appeal to Western consciousnesses.
While COMARU has successfully adopted strategies typical of a social movement
organization, it maintains its role as a representative organization--negotiating with the state,
municipality, and energy companies so they will initiate sustainable development projects in the
communities. COMARU has demonstrated its ability to successfully serve as an intermediary
time and time again through achieving compensation for the communities. NGO’s criticize
COMARU for negotiating too heavily with the companies, but COMARU stands by its company
negotiations because they recognize they can’t foster a completely adversarial relationship with
them if they are going to continue to receive compensation. Given that the communities do not
currently play a significant role in negotiations, COMARU should make an effort to involve
them more so that they may participate in the process of their own liberation.
While COMARU continues to negotiate with powerholders, an increased sense of
urgency has prompted the organization to take on strategies more typical of social movement
organizations (SMOs) such as strikes, roadblocks and protests. The participation of Machiguenga
community members in these public protests allows Machiguengas to take part in the process of
their own liberation and attract national and international attention to the demands of COMARU
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and the indigenous organizations with which it collaborates. These protests have come at the cost
of the deaths of Machiguengas, civilians and police officers, but in the end, they led to policy
changes favorable to the Machiguengas. The withdrawal of the two decrees within the “Law of
the Jungle” occurred partly through COMARU’s banding together with other Peruvian
indigenous groups, so COMARU should work to maintain and strengthen these coalitions to
achieve future similar victories.
This paper contributes to conversations started by political ecology scholars such as
Bebbington (2009) and McAdams (1988) due to its reliance upon social network theory, the
environmental identity and social movement thesis, change agents and collective action. Political
ecology helps shed light on how unequal power structures can provide a foundation for
environmental degradation, but in this paper, it also demonstrates how those unequal power
structures can be navigated and manipulated in the pursuit of justice for a historically
marginalized population. COMARU, like every organization that works for human rights in the
face of unwanted development, displays a few weaknesses within its structure that need to be
addressed to sustain organizational success. Nevertheless, COMARU proves to be an incredibly
unique organization because it has manipulated these unequal power structures in order to
promote the rights of this population it so genuinely cares for.
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